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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND SENTENCING
ANDRA LE ROUX-KEMP*
LEGISLATION
CRIMINAL LAW (FORENSIC PROCEDURES) AMENDMENT ACT 6 OF 2010
The Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Amendment Act 6 of
2010 came into operation on 18 January 2013 (GG 36080). This
Act will amend the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 by inserting
ss 36A, 36B and 36C in Chapter 3 of the Act. In terms of these
new provisions it will now be compulsory for police officials to
take the fingerprints of certain categories of persons. The South
African Police Service will also be able to retain and store these
fingerprints and body-prints on a database, and the prints may
also be used for the purposes of comparative (and cold-case)
searches. This Amendment Act further provides for the integrity,
operating procedures and general management of these data-
bases.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AMENDMENT ACT 8 OF 2013, AMENDING
SECTION 316 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977
The Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 8 of 2013 was pub-
lished in GG 36691 on 22 July 2013. This Act amends s 316 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 so as further to regulate
applications for condonation, leave to appeal, and additional
evidence, and to provide for matters connected therewith. The
new s 316 is deemed to have come into operation on 10 Septem-
ber 2010.
Also see the discussion of Sengama v S 2013 (2) SACR 377
(SCA) and Nabolisa vS2013 (2) SACR 221 (CC) below.
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES AMENDMENT ACT 5 OF 2011
The date of commencement of s 9 of the Correctional Services
Amendment Act 5 of 2011, insofar as it relates to s 49G of the
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Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, was set for 1 July 2013 in
Proc 21 GG36621 of 1 July 2013.
Section 49G of the Act provides that the maximum period of
incarceration of a remand detainee may not exceed two years
without the matter having been brought to the attention of the
court concerned. This period is determined from the initial date of
admission to the remand detention facility. It is furthermore
provided that no remand detainee shall be brought before a court
under s 49G, if he or she has appeared before a court three
months immediately prior to the expiry of the two-year period, and
that court has, at that appearance, considered the continued
detention of the detainee.
DANGEROUS WEAPONS ACT 15 OF 2013
The Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013 was published in
GG 36704 on 24 July 2013 and will come into operation on a
date to be determined by the President by proclamation in the
Government Gazette. This Act repeals the Dangerous Weapons
Act in the areas of the erstwhile South Africa, Transkei,
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. It also amends the Regula-
tion of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 and the Firearms Control Act
60 of 2000.
See, too, the discussion of the constitutional validity of certain
provisions of the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 in 2010
Annual Survey 363.
THE NATIONAL POLICY FRAMEWORK ON THE MANAGEMENT OF
SEXUAL OFFENCES
The National Policy Framework on the Management of Sexual
Offences, drafted in terms of s 62(1) of the Criminal Law
(Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of
2007, was published on 6 September 2013 in GN R649,
GG 36804. This National Policy Framework is a revised version
of the first National Policy Framework tabled in Parliament in
June 2011. The primary goal of the document is to provide for
a collective effort between the various state departments in
responding to and preventing sexual violence in all its manifesta-
tions.
The Policy Framework therefore seeks to establish coordinated
planning, resource allocation and execution of services within the
sexual offences sector. It entrenches the victim-centred CJS
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(Criminal Justice System), and promotes specialisation in service
delivery to respond to the special needs of the victims (s 7).
CASE LAW
ADMISSION OF GUILT IN TERMS OF SECTION 57 OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977
The accused in S v Parsons 2013 (1) SACR 38 (WCC) was
persuaded to pay an admission of guilt fine on a complaint of
'disturbing the peace' (para [1]). The admission of guilt and
payment of a fine are regulated by s 57 of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977, which stipulates that the payment of the fine and
the return of the summons and written notice to the court having
jurisdiction, would render the offender as duly convicted and
'such a conviction is regarded as a conviction for all statutory
and common-law offences' (paras [2], [3]).
While the option to pay a fine and not appear before a
magistrate is 'fatally attractive to an unsuspecting member of
public', such action will lead to the offender having a criminal
record and being regarded as duly convicted of the offence
(paras [5]-[7]). Yet, many people who choose to pay the admis-
sion of guilt fine are not informed of the full extent of the
consequences, and the accused in this case was unaware that it
would result in her having a criminal record. The court further-
more found that the written notice to appear (in terms of s 56 of
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977) did not make it clear that
admission of guilt and the payment of a fine will translate into a
conviction (para [6]). Justices Dlodlo and Mantame for the
Western Cape High Court held that the written notice to appear
'needs improvement because, as it stands, it may not pass
constitutional muster. It cannot be left to the police officer serving
an accused person with the written notice to appear to also
explain to such an accused person that the payment of the fine
and admission of guilt would also lead to a conviction and
criminal record' (para [6]).
The accused in this matter was found to have mistakenly
admitted her guilt and the conviction was set aside (para [7]).
Also see S v Tong 2013 (1) SACR 346 (WCC) where the convic-
tion was set aside as the police officer did not explain the
implications of paying the admission of guilt fine to the applicant,
and the matter did not therefore comply with the requirements of
s 56 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
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AUTOMATIC REVIEW IN TERMS OF SECTION 85(1) OF THE CHILD
JUSTICE ACT 75 OF 2008
Section 85(1) of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 provides for
the automatic review of certain cases where the child was under
the age of sixteen years at the time of the offence (s 85(1)(a)), or
sixteen years and older but under the age of eighteen years and
had been sentenced to any form of direct imprisonment that was
not wholly suspended or any sentence of compulsory residence
in a child and youth care centre as provided for in s 191(2)(j) of
the Children's Act 38 of 2005 (s 85(1)(b)). While s 85 of the Child
Justice Act 75 of 2008 mentions no requirement with regard to
legal representation, the automatic review of the sentence
referred to in s 85(1) must be conducted in terms of s 304 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, and s 302(3) of the latter Act
stipulates that no right of automatic review exists in cases where
the accused was legally represented at the trial (para [7]).
The central question in the case of S v Sekoere 2013 (2) SACR
426 (FB) was therefore whether a minor (sixteen to seventeen
years of age), who had had legal representation throughout the
trial and was sentenced to direct imprisonment, was entitled to
the benefit of automatic review. The accused in this case pleaded
guilty to a charge of housebreaking with the intent to steal and
theft. He was legally represented and was sentenced, in view of
his previous convictions, to twelve months' imprisonment (para
[4]).
Justice Daffue for the Free State High Court, Bloemfontein,
considered the history of the promulgation of the Child Justice
Act 75 of 2008 in South Africa, as well as developments in the
international arena with regard to child justice (paras [7]-[12]).
Sections 82 and 83 of the Act specifically require that children in
criminal proceedings be afforded legal representation at state
expense - a right which may not be waived (para [13]). This
legal assistance for minors in criminal proceedings is further
defined and detailed in regulation 48 of GN 251 of GG 33067 of
31 March 2010. The effect of these provisions, it was held, makes
it 'unthinkable, or at least highly unlikely, that a minor accused will
ever be without legal representation' (para [14]).
Given this premium placed on the importance of legal repre-
sentation for minors in criminal proceedings under the Child
Justice Act (as also by the Constitution and international instru-
ments) it was held that s 85(1) provides for an automatic review,
even if the child had legal representation during the trial (para
[19]).
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Also see S v Ruiter(311/2010) [2010] ZAWCHC 265 (14 June
2011); S v LM (Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape:
Children's Rights Project of the Community Law Centre and
Others as amici curiae 2013 (1) SACR 188 (WCC); S v Fortuin
(38/2011) [2011] ZANCHC 28 (11 November 2011); S v FM2013
(1) SACR 57 (GNP); and S v CV2012 (1) SACR 595 (ECP).
For an opposing view see S v Nakedi (12/2012) [2012]
ZANWHC 5 (2 January 2012) and S v TS 2013 (1) SACR 92 (FB).
AUTOMATIC REVIEW IN TERMS OF SECTION 302 OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977
Section 302 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 makes
provision for the automatic review of certain cases. Section 303 of
the Act further provides peremptory provisions for the speedy
transmission of the record and administration related to such an
automatic review (para [2]). Yet, in S v Cele 2013 (2) SACR 146
(KZP) the matter was only referred for automatic review under
s 302 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 six months after it
had been finalised, and the accused sentenced to an effective
three years' imprisonment (paras [1], [2]). By the time that the
matter was heard, the accused had already spent ten months in
prison (para [5]).
Justice Steyn for the Kwa-Zulu Natal High Court, Pietermar-
itzburg, held that this six months' delay defeated the purpose of
the automatic review procedure which is aimed at ensuring that
the proceeding was in accordance with justice (para [2]). He
further held that the system of automatic review should be valued
as a form of protection of the fundamental rights of an accused
and should not be compromised by administrative incompetence
(para [5]; also see S v VC 2013 (2) SACR 146 (KZP)). In reviewing
all the circumstances of the case and the factors taken into
consideration in sentencing, the accused's sentence was set
aside and replaced by a term of eighteen months' correctional
supervision in terms of s 276(1)(h) of the Criminal Procedure Act
51 of 1977.
BAIL
The appellants in Memeza and others v S (A310/2012) [2013]
ZAFSHC 27 (14 March 2013), were arraigned on two counts of
robbery with aggravating circumstances; one count of house-
breaking with the intent to steal and attempted theft; and two
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counts of possession of unlicensed semi-automatic firearms. The
appellants failed in their application for bail as well as the appeal
against the refusal of their bail application (para [1]). A second
bail application based on new facts was also denied, and it is the
appeal against the refusal of this second bail application that
forms the basis of this judgment.
The second bail application was brought after certain of the
state witnesses had testified, but before the state had closed its
case (para [4]). The trial magistrate dismissed this second bail
application indicating that it was not possible for the court to
make a definite ruling on the probative value of the new facts on
which the second bail application was based, and that the
strength of the state's case could not be determined as the state
had not yet closed its case (para [4]).
With reference to an unreported case by the Supreme Court of
Appeal, Mooi v State [2012] ZASCA 79, 30 May 2012 (case no
162/12) Justice Molemela for the Free State High Court, Bloem-
fontein, held that a court can determine the strength of a case
against an accused before the state has closed its case (para
[6]). It was held that
This is not surprising at all. Clearly, the fact that the State's case has
not yet been closed serves as no bar to the assessment of its strength.
If this assessment can be done in a bail application launched before
the beginning of the trial, on the basis of evidence adduced by or an
affidavit deposed to the investigating officer, there is no reason why it
cannot be done after the commencement of the trial but before the
closure of the State's case (para [6]; also see S v Vermaas 1996 (1)
SACR 528 (T)).
See further, Prinsloo v S (613/2013) [2013] ZASCA 178
(29 November 2013).
DECLARING A PERSON A HABITUAL CRIMINAL IN TERMS OF SECTION
286(1) OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977
Section 286(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
provides for a court to declare an offender a habitual criminal if it
is satisfied that the offender habitually commits offences and that
the community should be protected against him or her. This
declaration can be made in lieu of the imposition of any other
punishment for the offence or offences of which the offender
stands convicted. The requirements for a declaration under
s 286(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 were set out in
S v Van Eck 2003 (2) SACR 563 (SCA) par [9]:
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* the court must be satisfied that the offender habitually com-
mits crimes and that the nature of the crimes necessitates the
protection of the community (S v Makoula 1978 (4) SA
763 768B-E);
* the accused must be older than eighteen years of age; and
* punishment that does not exceed fifteen years' imprisonment
must be warranted.
However, despite these requirements, the court retains a
discretion whether or not to issue a declaration in terms of
s 286(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (para [9]).
Further, although it is not required that an accused be warned of
the risk of being declared an habitual criminal before such a
declaration is made, and the fact that such a warning was not
given, does not impact on a court's discretion to declare an
offender a habitual criminal. However, it is settled practice not to
declare a person a habitual criminal without prior warning, save
for exceptional circumstances (para [10], S v Magqabi 2004 (2)
SACR 551 (E)).
With regard to the parole of habitual criminals, s 65(4)(b)(iv) of
the Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959 provides that such an
offender who has been declared a habitual criminal shall be
detained in prison and only becomes eligible for parole after
a period of at least seven years, but shall not be detained for a
period exceeding fifteen years' imprisonment (para [6]); also see
S v Niemand 2001 (2) SA CR 654 (CC)).
The appellant in Smith v S (A02/2013) [2013] ZAFSHC 120
(27 June 2013) was declared a habitual criminal in terms of
s 286(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. He was first
convicted at the age of nineteen years, and eight further convic-
tions followed in quick succession. Thereafter, the appellant's
convictions were more widely spaced: first a period of two and a
half years without a conviction; then five and a half years; which
was followed by another period of two and a half years and
another period of four and a half years (paras [23], [24]). In total,
the appellant was convicted of eleven crimes over a period of 25
years (para [27]). However, no information was provided to the
court on the appellant's personal circumstances, or on the reason
for the long periods between his convictions in later years (paras
[24], [25]).
Justice Snellenburg of the Free State High Court, Bloemfontein,
held that the appellant's previous convictions did not in itself warrant
a declaration as a habitual criminal, and that the sentencing court
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had not given sufficient weight to the appellant's personal circum-
stances (para [29]) - especially after the court in S v Masisi 1996
(1) SACR 147 (0) required 'a more careful enquiry and investiga-
tion into the personal circumstances, including the nature and
frequency of criminal conduct in the past, the kind of punishment
metered out and its apparent effect' (para [17]).
WHAT CONSTITUTES A CRIME OF PASSION?
A crime of passion is an offence committed 'without rational
reflection ... whilst the perpetrator was influenced by [a] barely
controllable emotion' (S v Mvamvu 2005 (1) SACR 54 (SCA) 59). It
is an action born 'spontaneously ... from provocation, driven by
anger without sufficient time to consider [the consequences of
the] actions' (Dikana v S [2008] 2 All SA 182 (E) 186).
In S v Mgibelo 2013 (2) SACR 559 (GSJ) the court had to
decide whether the accused's actions amounted to a crime of
passion and therefore constituted a substantial and compelling
circumstance that warranted a lesser sentence. The accused
planned and deliberately set fire to the shack in which her ex-
boyfriend, his girlfriend and their child were sleeping. The
accused's ex-boyfriend died from his burn wounds and
the accused was convicted of murder, arson and attempted
murder (para [1]).
The court described the accused's actions as 'callous, cruel
and brutal ... pure savagery ... [and] the deceased succumbed
to his painful injuries with his body almost unrecognisable while
the surviving victim was left scarred for life' (para [5]). The
accused's modus operandi was furthermore described as driven
by revenge or vengefulness, well planned, and executed over a
period of at least sixteen hours (paras [6], [8]). The accused did
not use this time to 'cool off', and even after she had set the shack
alight and the deceased and his girlfriend were fighting for their
lives, she expressed her desire to 'finish off the deceased' (para
[8]). This behaviour, it was held, does not constitute a crime of
passion (para [12]; also see S v Rosslee 2006 (1) SACR 537
(SCA)).
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 136(1) OF THE CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES ACT 111 OF 1998
The applicants in Broodryk and others v Minister of Correc-
tional Services and others (6958/11) [2013] ZAGPPHC 280
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(9 September 2013), challenged the constitutionality of s 136(1)
of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, claiming that the
provision is inconsistent with the provisions of s 35(3)(n) of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, as it infringes
on their right to a fair trial, including the right to 'benefit from the
least severe of the prescribed punishments if the prescribed
punishment for the offence has been changed between the time
that the offence was committed and the time of sentencing'.
The applicants were serving determinate sentences imposed
on them after 1 October 2004, and were, in terms of s 73(6)(a) of
the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, therefore eligible to be
considered for release on parole after having served half of their
sentence. Section 73(6)(a) of the Act stipulates that offenders
serving a determinate or cumulative sentence of more than 24
months must be considered for release on parole after having
either served the fixed non-parole period, or if no non-parole
period was fixed, half of the sentence or 25 years of the sentence
imposed.
Section 136(1), on the other hand, applies to sentences
imposed after 1 October 2004 and allows for the policy and
guidelines of the former Parole Boards to apply. This allows for
prisoners to be allocated the maximum number of credits in terms
of s 22A of the Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959. In terms of this
erstwhile framework for parole - which was in place when the
applicants committed their offences, but not when they were
sentenced - the applicants would have been eligible for parole
after having served one third of their sentences, thereby provid-
ing for a shorter term of incarceration than the current parole
policies.
Considering the case law over the past four years dealing with
the application of the various parole policies of the Department of
Correctional Services, Justice van Oosten for the Gauteng High
Court dismissed the application (paras [4]-[9]; Van Vuren v
Minister of Correctional Services and Others 2012 (1) SACR 103
(CC); Makaba v The Minister of Correctional Services and others
FSHC 16 August 2012 (case no 5369/2011); Van Wyk v Minister of
Correctional Services and Others 2012 (1) SACR 159 (GNP). Also
see the Canadian cases of R v Gamble [1988] 2 SCR 595 and
Caruana v Director of Bath Institution, Commissioner of Correc-
tions and Attorney General of Canada 2002 CanLII 49628 (ON
SC)). He stated that the correct interpretation of the word
'punishment' in s 35(3)(n) of the Constitution, 1996, does not
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include an extended meaning that includes the serving of sen-
tences or the way in which punishment is served, but rather refers
to the prescribed punishments imposed on an accused after
conviction (para [11]). The date of sentencing is consequently the
operative date for purposes of determining parole eligibility and
also in terms of the protection that s 35(3)(n) of the Constitution
provides (para [12]).
DEFINING 'CORRECTIONAL SUPERVISION' IN TERMS OF SECTION
276(1)(h) OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977
The accused in S v BL 2013 (1) SACR 140 (GNP), a sixteen-
year-old minor, was convicted of robbery with aggravating cir-
cumstances and sentenced to three years' correctional supervi-
sion in terms of s 276(1)(h) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977 (para [4]). The trial magistrate, however, failed to determine
the nature and scope of the correctional supervision.
It was held, on review, that the term 'correctional supervision
does not connote a sentence, but refers to a collective term used
to describe various measures which have in common that they
are all applied outside prison, such as monitoring, house arrest,
community service, placement in employment or rehabilitation
programmes' (para [8]). It is therefore not enough for a magistrate
to sentence an offender to correctional supervision without
identifying the specific measures applicable to the offender and
without formulating the general framework within which the
measures should be implemented (para [9]).
DISPARITY IN SENTENCES IMPOSED ON OFFENDERS WHO PARTICIPATED
IN THE SAME CRIME AND WHOSE PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES WERE
MATERIALLY THE SAME
In Abrahams v S (A520/2012) [2013] ZAWCHC 201 (19 March
2013), the appellant and two further accused (Paulse and
Woodman) pleaded not guilty to a charge of robbery with
aggravated circumstances in the Cape Town Regional Court.
During the course of the trial Woodman changed his plea to
guilty, and his trial was separated from the trials of Paulse and the
appellant. The appellant and Paulse were eventually convicted
and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment of which two years
were suspended on certain conditions (para [2]). Woodman, who
had pleaded guilty, was, however, sentenced to only four years'
imprisonment, suspended for five years on certain conditions,
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including that he submit himself for rehabilitation for his drug
dependency (para [3]). The appellant consequently applied for
leave to appeal and leave to adduce further evidence relating to
the differences in sentence imposed on Woodman and himself.
The trial magistrate granted the leave to appeal but also indi-
cated that even if she had been aware of the sentence imposed
on Woodman, it would not have influenced her as she did not
agree with the sentence that Woodman had received (para [4]).
Central to the grounds of appeal was the startling disparity
between the sentence imposed on Woodman and the sentence
imposed on the appellant. It was evident from the evidence and
testimony, that it was Woodman who had initiated the robbery by
first drawing a knife, and he was also the person who had
stabbed the complainant after he had handed over his cell phone
as ordered. Yet, the appellant argued, Woodman received a
non-custodial sentence while the appellant, who was an accom-
plice responsible for driving the getaway vehicle and who had no
interaction with the complainant, received a custodial sentence of
six years (para [9]).
These two sentences were not only strikingly different, but it
was also submitted that they were '. . . inversely proportional to
the gravity of the actions sought to be penalised in that [Wood-
man] who played the palpably more active and blameworthy role
in the robbery received a substantially lesser sentence' (para [9]).
It was further argued that Woodman's personal circumstances
which were taken into account as mitigating circumstances in his
case, were materially the same as those of the appellant. Both
were very young, first offenders, and both were addicted to tik
(para [10]).
In S v Giannoulis 1975 (4) SA 867 (A) it was held that a disparity
in the sentences imposed on participants to an offence would not
necessarily warrant interference on appeal. 'Uniformity,' it was
found, 'should not be elevated to a principle, at variance both
with a flexible discretion in the trial court and with the accepted
limitation of appellant interference therewith' (para [12]). How-
ever, where a disturbing disparity between the sentences exists,
and the offenders' degrees of participation were more or less
equal and there are no substantial and compelling circum-
stances warranting the disparity, then an appeal court may,
depending on the circumstances of the particular case, interfere
with the sentence imposed. It was warned, however, that such
interference should not be aimed at equating the sentences, but
rather at doing what is appropriate in the circumstances (para
[12]).
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With due consideration to all the circumstances surrounding
this offence, as well as the personal circumstances of the
appellant, Justice Boqwana for the Western Cape High Court
found that the trial magistrate should have given more consider-
ation to the influence that the appellant's drug addiction had
played in his life choices and in the offence in particular (para
[18] and see Nel v S 2007 (2) SACR 481 (SCA)). It was further
found that the appellant was a 'clear candidate' for rehabilitation
outside of the prison environment, and his sentence was accord-
ingly amended to four years' imprisonment suspended for five
years on the usual conditions, including that he submit himself to
rehabilitation for his drug addiction (paras [21], [23]).
ENTERING A MINOR'S NAME IN THE NATIONAL REGISTER OF SEXUAL
OFFENDERS AFTER A CONVICTION IN TERMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
(SEXUAL OFFENCES AND RELATED MATTERS) AMENDMENT ACT 32 OF
2007
In Johannes v S 2013 (2) SACR 599 (WCC) the accused, who
was a fourteen-year-old minor at the time of the commission of the
offence, was convicted on three charges of rape in contravention
of s 3 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters)
Amendment Act 32 of 2007, and sentenced to five years'
compulsory residence in a Child and Youth Care Centre in terms
of s 76(1) of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 (paras [1]-[4]). The
accused was also sentenced to an additional three years'
imprisonment after the completion of the five years' compulsory
residence in terms of s 76(3) of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008.
And, in respect of a conviction of assault with the intent to do
grievous bodily harm, the accused was sentenced to a further six
months' imprisonment suspended for a period of three years on
condition that he was not convicted of assault during the period
of suspension (paras [5], [6]).
An order was furthermore made in terms of s 50(2) of the
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment
Act 32 of 2007, that the accused's name be entered in the
National Register for Sexual Offenders (para [7]). In terms of
s 50(2)(a)(i) of the Act, a court must make an order that the
particulars of a person be included in the Register if that person
has been convicted of a sexual offence against a child or a
person who is mentally disabled (para [12]).
In this matter, Justice Henney for the Western Cape High Court
had to decide whether the sentencing court was competent to
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make an order in terms of s 50(2) of the Sexual Offences Act if
regard is had to the objectives of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008
(particularly ss 2-4), as well as the provisions of s 28 of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (para [8]). (Both
the regional magistrate and the Director of Public Prosecutions
Western Cape (DPP) recommended that an order in terms of
s 50(2)(a)(ii) of the Sexual Offences Act was a competent order
for the sentencing court to make (para [9]).
It was argued on behalf of the state that the sentencing court
had no discretion to decline to make an order in terms of s 50(2),
since the Sexual Offences Act does not distinguish between a
child sexual offender and an adult sexual offender (para [53]). In
S vRB; S vDK 2010 (1) SACR 447 (NCK), for example, it was held
that the inclusion of the particulars of a minor in the register
constitutes a justifiable limitation of the child offender's rights
(para [62]). However, the serious inroads that the peremptory
inclusion of an offender's particulars in the register make on his
or her constitutional rights, including the rights to dignity, pri-
vacy, fair labour practices, and freedom of trade, occupation and
profession, also had to be considered, especially where the
offender was still a minor at the time of the commission of
the offence (para [55]). It was further held that s 28 of the
Constitution also protects the rights of children against degrada-
tion, and not to have their wellbeing and moral and social
development put at risk (para [56]).
In this regard, the amicus curiae on behalf of the Centre for
Child Law argued that the provisions of s 50(2) of the Sexual
Offences Act violated a number of rights of minor offenders, and
that it also undermined the objectives of the register itself (para
[70]). The amicus curiae argued that the primary aim of the
register is to protect children and persons with mental disabilities
from predatory adults by limiting such adults' employment oppor-
tunities to job categories that would give them access to children
or mentally disabled persons. It was further argued that the
impugned provision does not correctly reflect this purpose, in
that the state had failed to provide evidence to suggest that child
offenders guilty of sexual crimes against their peers later became
adult sex offenders who prey on children and/or the mentally
disabled (para [75]).
The court ultimately held that a child offender cannot be
regarded as less of a sex offender merely because of his or her
age (para [115]).
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Such an offender will remain a sex offender, irrespective of whether
such a person's particulars will be included in the Register or not. The
mere fact that an offender is a child sex offender, in my view, is not
sufficient justification per se for not having such a person's particulars
entered in the Register. Under certain circumstances, it may well be
that entering such details is a reasonable and justifiable limitation of
the rights of such an offender, and this would be especially so where
such a child sex offender might reasonably pose a threat or harm to
children or mentally disabled persons. However, in my view, such
decision to do so in the case of children, has to be constitutionally
compliant and has to be a measure of last resort given the circum-
stances of a particular case (para [115]).
It was consequently held that the provisions of the Sexual
Offences Act, including those regulating the inclusion of the
offender's particulars in the register, also apply to all child
offenders (para [118]). However, the court also concluded that
there may be circumstances involving child sex offenders that do
not call for the inclusion of his or her details in the register -
especially as there is a broad range of offences that fall under the
term 'sexual offence', some of which are not as serious as others.
(para [122]). Section 50(2) of the Sexual Offences Act was
therefore held to be overbroad in its quest to have all sexual
offenders who commit sexual offences against children or men-
tally disabled persons included in the register (para [121]). It was
held that courts should have a discretion whether or not to
include the particulars of a sex offender in the register, and the
offenders should furthermore be offered an opportunity to make
representations to persuade the court whether or not to grant
such an order (paras [126]-[131]).
Section 50(2) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and
Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 was consequently
declared invalid and inconsistent with the Constitution in so far as
it does not allow the court to inquire and decide, after affording
the accused an opportunity to make representations, whether or
not the particulars of the accused should be included in the
National Register for Sexual Offenders (para [137]).
ESTIMATING THE AGE OF A PERSON - SECTION 337 OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977 READ WITH SECTIONS 14 TO 16 OF THE
CHILD JUSTICE ACT 75 OF 2008
Section 16 of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 provides that if at
any stage during the proceedings, the presiding officer is satis-
fied, on the basis of evidence placed before him or her, that the
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age of the accused is incorrect, this must be altered on the
record of the proceedings in terms of s 14 of the Act.
How the unknown age of an accused person must be deter-
mined or estimated in the absence of conclusive proof thereof,
remains unclear. Section 337 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977 merely provides that the presiding officer can estimate the
age of such a person based on his or her appearance or from any
other information that may be available, and that the age so
estimated shall be deemed to be correct unless it is subsequently
proved to be incorrect (s 337(a)), or if the accused at such
proceedings could not lawfully have been convicted of the
offence with which he or she was charged if the correct age had
been proved (s 337(b)).
But estimating the age of an accused based merely on his or
her appearance is superficial, and clearly unscientific. As a
matter of good policy, estimation of age based on appearance
alone should resorted to only where the age of the accused is not
really an issue in the outcome of the trial. Furthermore, in terms of
method, appearance is, generally speaking, often misleading
and indeed fallible as a (sole) indicator of age. Environmental
factors, physical deprivation (including malnutrition), and sub-
stance abuse can all have an impact on a person's appearance,
as well as his or her physical and mental development (for a
detailed comment on s 337 of the Criminal Procedure Act, see
A le Roux-Kemp in Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal
Procedure Act (revision service 51, 2013) 33-14).
Recent case law also shows that presiding officers are not
accessing the wide range of tools and potential sources of
evidence available to determine the true age of an accused, and
that the accused's supposed correct age is often amended on
the court record without a proper eviential basis.
The applicant in Mpofu v Minister for Justice and Constitutional
Development and Cthers 2013 (2) SACR 407 (CC) was convicted
of murder and other serious offences committed in January 1998.
He was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder charge and
28 years' imprisonment for the other offences, the latter to run
concurrently with the life term (para [4]). For the purpose of
sentencing, the court a quo accepted that the applicant was
twenty years of age at the time of sentencing and that he was in
his late teens at the time of the commission of the offence (para
[28]).
The applicant subsequently applied for leave to appeal against
his sentence arguing, inter alia, that the court had failed to take
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into account that he was a minor at the time of the commission of
the offences (para [5]). He relied on s 28(1)(g) of the Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which provides that a child
may only be imprisoned as a matter of last resort and for the
shortest possible period (para [7]).
While the Constitutional Court agreed that s 28 of the Constitu-
tion demands a different enquiry into sentencing - 'the starting
point in sentencing may well be different ... [t]his does not mean
that every sentencing court must expressly refer to s 28, but its
contents cannot be ignored' (para [22]) - the court failed to
provide guidance on the determination of an offender's age for
the purpose of criminal proceedings as set out in s 337 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 read together with ss 14-16 of
the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008.
The Constitutional Court merely relied on the judgment of the
court a quo and on the information collected by an amicus curiae
appointed to investigate the age of the applicant. However, the
amicus curiae did little more than try and find the applicant's birth
certificate, and even this enquiry was not successful as the
information provided by the Department of Home Affairs and the
information obtained from the National Population Registry data-
base did not match; the information indicated that the applicant
was born in 1977, 1979 or 1981 and that he was between sixteen
and twenty years old when the offences were committed (paras
[8], [30]-[33]). No conclusion could consequently be reached on
the applicant's age and it was held that the court a quo had
misdirected itself as it appears from references in the judgment
that the court accepted that the applicant was a child at the time
he committed the offences but failed to take this into consider-
ation in determining an appropriate sentence (paras [34], [47]).
In S v Gxaleka 2013 (2) SACR 399 (ECB), the fact that the
accused was under the age of eighteen years only emerged
during the trial when the complainant was cross-examined. The
proceedings were consequently halted and the matter referred
for review. In this case, Justices Van Zyl and Dukada for the
Eastern Cape High Court, Bhisho, merely considered the testi-
mony of witnesses as it appeared on the court record, and then
stated that '[i]t seems ... that the accused must have been older
than ten years but under the age of eighteen years when he was
arrested and detained' (para [15]). The matter was ordered to
start de novo in accordance with the provisions of the Child
Justice Act 75 of 2008 (para [24]).
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND SENTENCING
A DUTY TO CROss-APPEAL IN TERMS OF SECTION 316B OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977?
In Nabolisa v S 2013 (2) SACR 221 (CC) the Constitutional
Court had to consider whether the state is obliged to cross-
appeal in circumstances where an accused initiates an appeal
against his sentence, or whether a notice in the state's heads of
argument seeking an increase of the sentence, is sufficient. The
appellant in this case appealed against his conviction and
sentence to the Supreme Court of Appeal which upheld his
conviction and increased his sentence from twelve to twenty
years' imprisonment (para [1]). The state did not initiate a
cross-appeal but indicated twice in its heads of argument, and
also in its supplementary heads of argument, that the sentence
should be increased (para [7]). The Supreme Court of Appeal
agreed with this and held that the provisions of the minimum
sentencing legislation should apply and, considering the serious-
ness of the crime and the fact that in most cases the courier of the
drugs in this criminal scheme was caught while the handlers
remained safe, that the sentence should be increased to twenty
years' imprisonment (para [9]).
However, the appellant argued that s 316B of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 creates a peremptory statutory require-
ment of cross-appeal by the state if the state seeks an increase in
sentence on appeal (para [11]). It was further submitted that the
practice that existed prior to 1990 (before s 316B of the Criminal
Procedure Act was introduced) which allowed the state to merely
request in its heads of argument for a sentence to be increased,
was abolished by the introduction of s 316B and to allow for 'this
old practice to continue would render s 316B superfluous, and
would be absurd because it would allow the State to request an
increase in sentence in instances where leave to appeal may
have been refused' (para [12]). The appellant also argued that his
sentence was not increased mero motu by the Supreme Court of
Appeal, but in light of the state's notice in its heads of argument
(para [13]).
The state, in turn, argued that s 316B merely fills a lacuna that
existed in the law; previously the state was unable to appeal to
rectify a sentence that was overly lenient when the accused had
elected not to appeal, and s 316B now made it possible for the
state to appeal at its own initiative (para [15]). Section 316B, it
was submitted, does not remove the 'old practice' and the
determination of a possible new sentence was already a live
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issue before the Supreme Court of Appeal, irrespective of the
notice in the state's head of arguments (para [15]).
Justice Skweyiya for the Constitutional Court (Moseneke and
Van der Westhuizen concurring) confirmed the state's submission
that s 316B was intended to fill a lacuna in the law by creating an
independent right for the state to appeal and did not change the
'old practice by creating a duty on the state to cross-appeal
where the accused initiated an appeal because, in those
instances, the state would be before the court of appeal already'
(para [26]). Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959, read
together with s 322 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977,
furthermore empowers a court of appeal to confirm, amend or set
aside a judgment or order including the setting aside, reduction
or increase of a sentence (para [27]). It was consequently
concluded that s 316B of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
'does not create a peremptory requirement for cross-appeal and
the failure by the State to do so does not constitute an irregularity'
(para [30]).
A DUTY TO PROVIDE LEGAL AID FOR PARTICIPANTS TO A COMMISSION
OF INQUIRY?
The applicants in Magidiwana and others v President of the
Republic of South Africa and others (CCT 100/13) [2013] ZACC
27; 2013 (11) BCLR 1251 (CC) represented members of a class
of persons who were arrested or injured by members of the South
African Police Service at the Marikana mine during August 2012.
The applicants sought to secure funding to cover their legal and
other expenses incurred in participating in the Marikana Commis-
sion of Inquiry, a Commission established by the President to
investigate and report on 'matters of public, national and interna-
tional concern arising out of the tragic incidents at the Lonmin
Mine in Marikana' (para [1]).
Initially, the legal and other expenses incurred by the appli-
cants with their participation in the Commission's proceedings
were funded by a non-governmental organisation, The Raid
Foundation. This funding, however, only covered the first six
months of the Commission's activities and the applicants were
unable to secure further funding (para [2]). Moreover, the Minister
of Justice and Constitutional Developed declined their request for
funding indicating that 'no legal framework [existed] through
which government can contribute to the legal expenses of any of
the parties who participate in the commission of inquiry' (para
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[3]). Legal Aid South Africa also denied the applicants' request as
this statutory body was already operating under severe budget-
ary constraints and its policy documents do not make provision
for the funding of legal expenses incurred at commissions of
inquiry (para [4]).
An application was consequently lodged with the High Court
for the President, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development, and/or Legal Aid South Africa to provide the
applicants with legal aid at state expense for the duration of
the Commission's proceedings (para [5]). This application was,
however, dismissed.
In a decision by the Constitutional Court, it was held that the
South African Bill of Rights only makes explicit provision for a
person to claim legal representation at state expense in the
following three instances:
* A child has the right to have a legal practitioner assigned to
him or her by the state and at state expense in all proceedings
affecting the child and if substantial injustice would otherwise
result (s 28(1)(h) of the Constitution, 1996).
* A detainee also has a right to a legal representative assigned
to him or her by the state and at state expense if substantial
injustice would otherwise result (s 35(2)(c) of the Constitution,
1996).
* Every accused's right to a fair trial includes the right to have a
legal practitioner assigned to him or her by the state and at
state expense if a substantial injustice would otherwise result
(s 35(3)(g) of the Constitution, 1996).
The applicants clearly did not fall within any of these three
categories of persons entitled to legal representation at state
expense. However, the Constitutional Court agreed that unfair-
ness may arise when adequate legal representation is not
provided, and also held that it falls within the domain of state
organs to ensure that legal aid is provided to participants when
such commissions of inquiry are established (para [15]). The
judiciary, however, has no power to order the executive branch of
government how to deploy state resources, and since the appli-
cants did not challenge the constitutionality of the provisions of
the Legal Aid Act 22 of 1969, the application for leave to appeal
had to be dismissed (para [16]).
Also see Magidiwana and another v President of the Republic
of South Africa and others 2014 1 All SA 76 (GNP).
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THE EFFECT OF THE AMENDMENT TO S 316(10) OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977
Before the amendment of s 316(10) of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977, a court could not dispose of a petition without
having received the full record of the trial. This resulted in
considerable delays, a substantial backlog of petitions, and the
incurring of substantial costs in preparing and lodging records.
This was, above all, unnecessary as there was 'no practical need
for records to be lodged before disposing of petitions as appli-
cants are obliged in terms of s 316(4)(a) of the Criminal Proce-
dure Act 51 of 1977 to set out clearly and specifically the grounds
upon which leave to appeal is sought' (Sengama v S 2013 (2)
SACR 377 (SCA) para [4]).
This situation has been remedied by the Criminal Procedure
Amendment Act 8 of 2013 which amends s 316(10)(c) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, and does away with the
obligation on the Registrar of a High Court who receives notice of
a petition to automatically forward the record of the trial to the
relevant court (para [5]). Registrars are now only obliged to do so
if:
(i) the accused was not legally represented at the trial; or
(ii) the accused is not legally represented for the purposes of
the petition; or
(iii) the prospective appeal is not against the sentence only; or
(iv) the judges considering the petition, in the interest of justice,
request the record or only a portion of the record
(s 316(10)(c)).
The 'or' in this provision should be read conjunctively, as if the word
'and' had appeared at that point, to give effect to the manifest
purpose of the legislation which is to dispense with the need to file
the record of the proceedings in most cases (para [7]). The only
exceptions are when the accused was not legally represented at
the trial, or where the accused is not legally represented for the
purposes of the petition. In both these instances the Registrar is still
obliged to furnish the record of the proceedings to the court on
receiving the notice of a petition (para [8]).
AN EXCEPTIONALLY LONG DETERMINATE SENTENCE VERSUS A
SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT
The applicant in Houston v S 2013 (5) BCLR 527 (CC) sought
leave to appeal against two sentences imposed on him in
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separate cases in the KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban. Having
been convicted of murder, kidnapping and robbery with aggra-
vating circumstances in 1997, he was sentenced to an effective
term of 30 years' imprisonment. And in February 1998, he was
convicted on two counts of murder and two counts of robbery
with aggravating circumstances and sentenced to an effective 40
years' imprisonment (para [1]). Although the cumulative effect of
the two sentences was considered at the second trial, the
sentences were not ordered to run concurrently, and the appli-
cant was consequently sentenced to an effective 70 years'
imprisonment (para [1]).
The applicant contended that the parole policies of the Depart-
ment of Correctional Services in terms of this determinate sen-
tence of 70 years' imprisonment unfairly discriminated against
him (para [3]). Had he been sentenced to life imprisonment, for
example, the applicant would already have been eligible for
parole as he was sentenced before 1 October 2004 and his
eligibility date for parole could therefore be advanced by credits
as per earlier legislation (para [5] and see Van Vuren v Minister of
Correctional Services and Others 2012 (1) SACR 103 (CC)). With
a determinate sentence, however, the applicant would only
become eligible for parole after having served a third of his
sentence which amounts to more than 23 years in prison (para
[4]). Ironically, the sentencing court considered the appropriate-
ness of a sentence of life imprisonment in this case, but found
that a life sentence is only appropriate where there are no
prospects of rehabilitation (para [4]). Thus, while the sentencing
court recognised the possibility of rehabilitation for the applicant,
the end result of the sentence imposed is an effective term that is
longer than the term that the applicant would have spent in prison
had he been sentenced to life imprisonment.
However, despite the anomaly created with this determinate
term of imprisonment, the Constitutional Court did not intervene in
this matter and found that the appropriate remedy lies in seeking
a review of the parole policies of the Department of Correctional
Services (para [7]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal also chose not to interfere in
what can be described as a Methuselah sentence of 275 years'
imprisonment in S v Mafoho 2013 (2) SACR 179 (SCA). The
appellant in this case was convicted on 60 counts involving
robbery with aggravating circumstances, attempted murder,
kidnapping, rape, attempted rape and pointing of a firearm (para
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[2]). The Supreme Court of Appeal refused to replace the
appellant's determinate sentence with a term of life imprison-
ment, stating that it is unable to substitute a sentence with one
which the trial court did not have the competency to impose at the
time (para [7]). It was furthermore held that life imprisonment was
not the prescribed sentence for any of the offences for which the
appellant was convicted (para [8]).
All the relevant parole policies from s 65(4) of the Correctional
Services Act 8 of 1959 to ss 73(6)(a) and 136(1) of the Correc-
tional Services Act 111 of 1998 and the Parole and Correctional
Supervision Amendment Act 87 of 1997 were also considered
(paras [9]-[20]). It was evident from the analysis of all the relevant
provisions that the appellant was eligible for consideration to be
released on parole after having served 25 years of his term of
imprisonment (para [21]). And, since this is effectively the same
period that applies to prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment,
the matter was found to be moot (para [21]).
This decision was criticised in Mahlatsi v S 2013 (2) SACR 625
(GNP) (discussed below) as Justice Lamprecht for the North
Gauteng High Court pointed out that the Supreme Court of
Appeal had failed to take into consideration the important differ-
ences between determinate sentences and a term of life impris-
onment when it comes to parole. First, it was held that there is no
guarantee that prisoners will be released on parole after having
served 25 years of their sentences as the legislative and policy
framework only requires that they be considered for release on
parole at this time. Furthermore, the Minister releases prisoners
sentenced to life imprisonment on parole, while the Parole Board
makes the parole decisions for prisoners serving determinate
sentences (para [26]). This, coupled with the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court of Appeal itself- stipulating that 'the sentence
imposed must be one which the court intends as the ultimate
punishment that should be served'- and that sentencing courts
should not therefore consider the possibility of release on parole
when determining an appropriate sentence, led to the North
Gauteng High Court questioning whether the decision in Mafoho
is binding (para [26]).
As is evident from this critique of the Mafoho decision, Justice
Lamprecht for the North Gauteng High Court took a more
decisive stand on the matter in Mahlatsi v S 2013 (2) SACR 625
(GNP). The appellant in this case was convicted on three counts
of robbery with aggravating circumstances and one count of
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kidnapping. He was sentenced to an effective term of 50 years'
imprisonment (para [4]). While the appeal court could not find
that the trial court had misdirected itself in any way, or that the
sentences imposed on each count individually could be
regarded as shocking or disturbingly inappropriate, it did find the
cumulative effect thereof excessive (paras [8], [11]).
Justice Lamprecht explained that before the death penalty
was abolished in South Africa, life imprisonment was seldom
imposed, and almost never served to the end of a person's
natural life. A term of life imprisonment was rather seen as a
sentence equal to twenty years' imprisonment because such
a prisoner would be considered for parole after having served
twenty years of his or her sentence (para [12]). After the abolition
of the death penalty, a trend developed of imposing single
sentences, or effective sentences in excess of 25 years. The
reasoning behind these sentences was that judicial officers
wanted to ensure that criminals whom they regarded to be a
danger to society, would not be released on parole after having
served only twenty years of their sentence (para [12]).
It was consequently concluded that no sentence should be
longer than life imprisonment as this is the most severe sentence
that can be imposed in the Republic of South Africa (para [21]).
Even where more than one life term is imposed, it will be
regarded as one sentence of life imprisonment (para [21]). And,
although s 73(1)(b) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998
provides that a person sentenced to life imprisonment will remain
in prison for the rest of his or her natural life, the parole release
policies to which s 73(1)(b) is subject, provide that a person
sentenced to life imprisonment must serve at least 25 years of the
sentence or, upon reaching the age of 65 years, be considered
for parole after having served at least fifteen years of the
sentence (s 73(6)(bXiv)). A person sentenced to life imprison-
ment is furthermore not released on parole by the Parole Board,
but on application to the Minister and after the Minister has
considered the Board's recommendation (s 73(5)(a)(ii)). Two
further statutory provisions also confirm 25 years as the maximum
possible term of imprisonment before parole must be considered.
First, s 276B(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
provides that the maximum non-parole period a court can fix is
either two-thirds of the sentence or 25 years, whichever is the
shorter. And with regard to offences to which prescribed mini-
mum sentences apply, it is stipulated that offenders sentenced in
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terms of s 51 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997,
may not be released on parole before at least four-fifths of the
sentence or 25 years have been served, whichever is the shorter
(s 73(6)(b)(v)).
It is therefore clear that the maximum effective term of impris-
onment that must be served before a convict must be considered
for release on parole is 25 years, and any punishment heavier
than this should not be considered lightly (paras [25], [28]). The
appellant's sentence in this case was consequently amended to
an effective term of 37 years imprisonment, which means that the
appellant will be considered for parole after having served a
period of 25 years (para [38] and see Zondo v S (627/12) [2013]
ZASCA 51 (28 March 2013).
Mthimkhulu v S 2013 (2) SACR 89 (SCA) and Mchunu and
another v S (825/2012) [2013] ZASCA 126 (25 September 2013)
deal with fixed non-parole periods in terms of s 276B(2) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. And in Silo v S (CA & R
4/2011) [2013] ZAECGHC 60 (11 May 2013), the appellant was
sentenced to an effective 25 years' imprisonment. It was empha-
sised that long terms of imprisonment should be reserved for
more serious offences, and that the effective term of imprison-
ment should be measured against the purpose of the imposition
of such an extremely long term (paras [17]-[19]). In this latter
case it was also held that the failure properly to consider the
cumulative effect of a sentence imposed constitutes a misdirec-
tion sufficient to attract interference (para [20]).
FACTORS TO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION FOR THE CANCELLATION
OR SUSPENSION OF A DRIVER'S LICENCE IN TERMS OF S 35 (3) OF THE
NATIONAL ROAD TRAFFIC ACT 93 OF 1996
Section 35(3) of the National Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996
requires of a court, having convicted a person of an offence
referred to in s 35(1), and after the presentation of evidence
under oath, to consider the suspension or disqualification of that
person's driving licence. In S v Swartz (86/2013) [2013] ZAFSHC
93 (13 June 2013) the following factors were listed for consider-
ation at such a s 35(3) enquiry.
Points of departure:
* The aim of the cancellation or suspension of a licence is to
advance the public good and should be regarded as a
significant part of the sentence (S v Van Rooyen 2012 (2)
SACR 141 (ECG) para [29]).
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* Thus, although the suspension or cancellation of a licence is
in the nature of punishment, its prime objective is to protect
the public (S v Maloney 1968 (2) SA 281 (0) 282F-G and R v
Retief 1960 (3) SA 258 (0) 262D-E).
* Section 34, which provides for a discretionary suspension or
cancellation of a driving licence, and s 35, which provides for
the mandatory suspension or cancellation of a driving licence,
should be read together and are not mutually exclusive (S v
Van Rooyen 2012 (2) SACR 141 (ECG) paras [10]-[12]).
* Courts should be reluctant to order non-suspension, and the
suspension of the licence for the prescribed period should be
the point of departure in all cases (S v Wilson 2001 (1) SACR
253 (T) 259g-h).
The Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey (USA) requires
that the following factors be taken into consideration
(1) The nature and circumstances of the accused's conduct, includ-
ing whether the conduct posed a high risk of danger to the public
or caused physical harm or damage to property;
(2) the accused's driving record including age and duration of time
as a licensed driver, and the number, seriousness, and frequency
of previous infractions;
(3) whether the accused did not commit any driving offences for a
substantial period before the most recent violation or whether the
nature and extent of the driving record indicates that there is a
substantial risk that he or she will commit another violation;
(4) whether the character and attitude of the accused indicate that he
or she is likely or unlikely to commit another violation;
(5) whether the accused's conduct was the result of circumstances
unlikely to recur;
(6) whether a licence suspension would cause excessive hardship to
the accused and/or dependents; and the need for personal
deterrence; and
(7) any other relevant factor clearly identified by the court may be
considered as well (State of New Jersey v Laura Moran 202 NJ
311; 997A. 2nd 210; 2010 NJ Lexis 588).
In the South African case of S v Mofokeng 1964 (1) SA 242 (0)
243H the following factors were also taken into consideration:
* the traffic conditions at the time of the offence;
* whether or not an accident had occurred
* whether the life of a road user was placed in danger;
* speed of travel;
* the number and ages of passengers in the accused's vehicle;
* the driving ability of the accused.
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The court also emphasised that, in terms of South African law,
the personal circumstances of an offender carry little or no weight
in a s 35(3) enquiry. This is evident from the points demerit
system which has already been implemented in Pretoria and
Johannesburg, and allows for points to be subtracted from a
driving licence in terms of the offence committed (Administrative
Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences Act 46 of 1998). As well as
from the previous position under s 146(a) of Ordinance 21 of
1966 where 'endorsement was a substantive sanction which a
court had the power to order irrespective of whether suspension
or cancellation was ordered' (para [13]).
GREATER CLARITY NEEDED ON 'SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPELLING
CIRCUMSTANCES'
In Fortune vS(A(R) 48/13) [2013] ZAWCHC 179 (22 November
2013), the appeal against a sentence was referred to the Western
Cape High Court as the magistrate felt that greater clarity was
needed on what constitutes 'substantial and compelling circum-
stances', and that a number of sentences imposed had been
reduced on appeal by the Western Cape High Court (para [1]).
In S vMalgas2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA) it was held that
If the sentencing court on consideration of the circumstances of the
particular case is satisfied that they render the prescribed sentence
unjust in that it would be disproportionate to the crime, the criminal
and the needs of society, so that an injustice would be done by
imposing that sentence, it is entitled to impose a lesser sentence (para
[40]).
This and the other sentencing principles set out in the Malgas
case, are now '. . . well established in our criminal law jurispru-
dence' (para [3] and see Director of Pub/ic Prosecutions, Kwa-
zulu-Natal v Ngcobo 2009 (2) SACR 361 (SCA)). Nonetheless,
difficulty is experienced in the application of these principles, and
'what appear to be incomensurate sentences, are in many cases
explicable by the realities that no one case is exactly like another'
(para [4]).
Binns-Ward for the Western Cape High Court also observed
that 'the individualisation of the sentencing process in matters in
which the prescribed minimum sentences apply does result to
some extent in the sentences imposed reflecting the individual
attitudes of judicial officers towards the legislative dispensation'
(para [4]). Sometimes judicial officers deviate too easily from the
prescribed minimum sentences (S v Matyityi 2011 (1) SACR 40
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(SCA) and S v Nkunkuma (101/13) [2013] ZASCA 122 (23 Sep-
tember 2013)), but courts have a duty to implement the pre-
scribed minimum sentences despite their personal doubts or
aversion to them (para [5] and S v Matyityi 2011 (1) SACR 40
(SCA) para [10]).
In S v Kwanape 2012 ZASCA 168 (26 November 2012) it was
held that 'courts are duty-bound to implement the sentences
prescribed in terms of the Act and that "ill-defined concepts such
as relative youthfulness or other equally vague and ill-founded
hypotheses that appear to fit the particular sentencing officer's
personal notion of fairness" ought to be eschewed' (para [15] and
S v Malgas 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA) para [9]).
While the prescribed sentencing regime does not therefore
exclude consideration of the factors ordinarily taken into account
for the purposes of sentencing, it may only be deviated from if
weighty considerations justify such a departure (paras [7], [8]
and S v Vilakazi 2012 (6) SA 353 (SCA); 2009 (1) SACR 552,
especially paras [13]-[20]). It can, therefore, be concluded that
'criminal courts have the duty to approach sentence treating
each case on its individual merits and mindful of the need to
apply the minimum sentence legislation in a manner that does not
result in punishment that is disproportionate having regard to the
peculiar circumstances of the commission of the offence and
the personal circumstances of the offender' (para [9]).
In this case the sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment was set
aside and substituted by a sentence of eight years' imprison-
ment. Factors taken into consideration included that the victim
had not been physically injured, the value of the property stolen
was relatively small, and the appellant was furthermore disinhib-
ited to some extent by the use of drugs (para [16]).
Also see S v PB 2013 (2) SACR 533 (SCA) and S v GK 2013 (2)
SACR 505 (WCC).
COMPOSITE SENTENCES TO BE AVOIDED
Justices van Zyl and Griffiths for the Eastern Cape High Court,
Grahamstown, warned against the imposition of composite sen-
tences (or globular sentences) for a number of offences (S v
Masiza 2013 (1) SACR 121 (ECG) para [8]).
A composite sentence not only presents difficulties on appeal
when the convictions on some but not all of the offences are set
aside, but it also poses problems when an appeal court finds that
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there were no substantial and compelling circumstances present
to justify the imposition of a sentence lower than the prescribed
minimum sentence in terms of the Criminal Law Amendment Act
105 of 1997 (para [8]). Afurther problem arises when a composite
sentence is imposed which is competent on one charge, but
incompetent on another (para [9]).
More appropriate means for mitigating the cumulative effect of
separate sentences is either to order that they run concurrently,
or to 'proportionally reduce each sentence imposed on those
counts which do not attract a minimum sentence so as to meet
the exigencies of the case' (para [8]).
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
The respondent in Minister van Polisie v Van der Vyver (861/
2011) [2013] ZASCA 39 (28 March 2013) was acquitted of the
murder of his girlfriend on 29 November 2007. (The case drew
widespread attention and speculation in the media, and neither
its facts, nor the unreported decision by the Western Cape High
Court will be discussed here.) The respondent consequently
claimed damages from the Minister of Safety and Security
alleging that the prosecution against him was unfounded and
based on malicious intent and objectives on the part of the police
investigators involved (para [2]). The Western Cape High Court
found in favour of the respondent and the appellant consequently
appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
The Supreme Court of Appeal considered the grounds for the
respondent's claim, ie that the police were malicious in their
investigation of the deceased's murder and in the respondent's
subsequent prosecution. The respondent alleged, for example,
that the police investigators tampered with the fingerprint evi-
dence, as well as the blood-stained shoeprint found in the
deceased's bathroom (para [3]). Furthermore, during the trial,
the police investigators alleged that the respondent's fingerprints
were found on a DVD cover found near the deceased's body, and
that this evidence placed him in the deceased's flat at the time of
the murder (para [5]). But expert testimony led during the trial
called this into question, as it was clear that the fingerprints
showed characteristics typical of latent prints lifted from a
rounded object - like a glass - and the fingerprints could
therefore not have been lifted from a flat object, like the DVD
cover. The Senior Superintendent of the SAPS eventually con-
ceded this under oath during his testimony (para [6]). The trial
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court subsequently found that the fingerprints in question could
not reasonably have been lifted from the DVD cover, and that
sufficient evidence had been placed before the court to indicate
the mala fides, or negligence, or incompetence of the police
investigators involved (para [7]).
The respondent also alleged that the untrue statements made
by another investigating officer with regard to an ornamental
hammer found in the respondent's possession, ultimately led to
the prosecution against him, and that the blatantly untrue state-
ments made by police investigator, Bartholomew, about the
blood-stained shoe print found in the deceased's bathroom,
further instigated the malicious prosecution against him (para
[9]).
In order for an allegation of malicious prosecution to succeed,
the respondent must prove a causal connection between the
actions of the appellant and the subsequent prosecution against
him, and further that these actions and the subsequent prosecu-
tion were based on the mala fides or malicious intent of the
appellant (para [21]; also see Lederman v Moharal Investments
(Pty) Ltd 1969 (1) SA 190 (A); Prinsloo v Newman 1975 (1) SA 481
(A); and Rudolph v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 (5) SA 94
(SCA)). With regard to the appellant's intent, only animus injuri-
andi is required, and the intent can also include dolus eventualis.
It will therefore suffice if the respondent is able to prove that the
appellant subjectively foresaw the possibility that his actions
might lead to the unfounded prosecution of the respondent (para
[21]).
While the court agreed with the respondent and the court a quo
that the police investigator, Bartholomew, acted with malice
against the respondent, it also found that the prosecution against
the respondent was not based solely on the evidence produced
and statements made by Bartholomew (para [22]). It was clear
that the respondent's prosecution had already commenced when
Bartholomew produced his evidence and conclusions, and the
state further elected to continue with the prosecution against
the appellant even after the truth about Bartholomew's deceit
emerged (para [23]). The respondent had therefore not proved
the required causality between the alleged malicious actions of
the appellant's employees and his subsequent prosecution (para
[25]).
In addition, the state advocates also indicated on 13 Decem-
ber 2006 that they intended continuing with the prosecution
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despite the anomalies with regard to the fingerprint evidence
which they, in any event, did not intend using in their case against
the respondent (para [36]). Further, while the fingerprint evidence
did play an integral role in the prosecution of the respondent from
16 July 2005 (when the prosecution was first initiated) until
13 December 2006, the respondent could not prove any malice
on the part of the police investigators responsible for the collec-
tion, analysis and presentation of this evidence in the criminal trial
(para [37]).
After careful consideration of all the relevant facts with regard
to the police investigation in this case, the Supreme Court of
Appeal found that the respondent had not been able to prove the
factual basis on which his claim for compensation was based,
and therefore found in favour of the appellant (para [43]).
CORRECT PROCEDURE FOR AN ENQUIRY INTO AN ACCUSED'S MENTAL
STATE AND REFERRAL TO A FACILITY AS AN INVOLUNTARY MENTAL
HEALTH USER: SECTION 78 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF
1977
The accused in S v Luphuwana (DH 10/07) [2013] ZAG-
PJHC 289 (6 November 2013) was charged with assault under
the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998. On the request of the
prosecutor and the testimony of the accused's mother (who was
also the complainant in the matter), the magistrate held an
enquiry into the mental state of the accused in terms of s 78(2) of
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The charges were not put
to the accused and he was not asked to plead. The accused's
legal representative, who was present throughout the proceed-
ings, did not object to this enquiry being held, nor did he
cross-examine the accused's mother with regard to her testimony
on the accused's mental state (para [2]).
The accused was subsequently referred to a facility for obser-
vation based on the magistrate's finding in terms of s 78(2) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 that the accused may not be
responsible for his actions due to mental illness or mental defect
(para [3]). The accused was eventually admitted to a facility for
observation, and a joint unanimous psychiatric report indicated
that he suffered from a cannabis-induced psychotic disorder, but
that this affliction was currently in remission. The report also
indicated that the accused had been unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his actions when he committed the offence, and
that he should be admitted as an involuntary mental health care
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user as contemplated in ss 32 and 33 of the Mental Health Care
Act 17 of 2002 (para [4]).
The magistrate then continued to hear the testimony of the
investigating officer, which was largely based on hearsay, and
made an order in terms of s 78(6)(ii)(aa) that the accused was
unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions, and
was unable to act in accordance therewith. It was also ordered
that the accused be admitted as an involuntary mental health
user in terms of s 37 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002
(para [8]). The accused's legal representative did not cross-
examine the investigating officer, and the magistrate also did not
find the accused 'not guilty' as is required under s 78(6)(a) before
ordering that the accused be detained as an involuntary mental
health user (para [10]).
Justice Coppin for the South Gauteng High Court, Johannes-
burg, described as 'disturbing' that the magistrate allowed for the
state to adduce evidence without the charges ever having been
put to the accused or his having been called upon to plead (para
[14]). The magistrate further allowed inadmissible evidence and,
contrary to s 78(6)(a), found that the accused committed the acts
with which he was charged but was not responsible on account
of his mental illness (para [15]). This was all the more disturbing
as there was nothing on the record to suggest that the accused
was unable to understand and participate in the proceedings
when he appeared before the magistrate (para [16]).
Section 78(6), it was held, assumes that the accused has the
necessary capacity to understand the proceedings and to make
a proper defence, that the charge had been put to the accused,
and that he pleaded to it. It also assumes that the magistrate's
finding on whether the accused committed the act is based on
admissible evidence (para [18]). The matter was consequently
referred back to the magistrate's court for the correct procedures
to be followed before an order in terms of s 78(2) and 78(6) are
made (para [21]).
PREVENTION OF ORGANISED CRIME ACT 121 OF 1998
The interpretation and application of s 44 of the Prevention of Organised
Crime Act 121 of 1998
The Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998, was
enacted to combat serious organised crime and to prevent
criminals from benefiting from the proceeds of their crimes. In line
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with these objectives, s 38 of the Prevention of Organised Crime
Act 121 of 1998 ('POCA') authorises a High Court to grant a
preservation order in respect of property, believed, on reason-
able grounds, to be the proceeds or instrumentalities of criminal
offences. Such an order is made without notice to the person
whose property is to be seized and preserved: with notice only
being given once the order has been served upon the property
owner (para [23]). The effect of such a preservation order is to
preserve the property to which it applies so that no person may
deal in any way with that property unless authorised by the High
Court who issued the preservation order. The order, furthermore,
remains in place until it is rescinded, a forfeiture order is granted,
a request for forfeiture is refused, or until the preservation order
expires exactly 90 days from the date on which the notice of the
order was published in the Gazette (s 40). Ultimately, the state
would be entitled to a forfeiture order only to the extent to which
the respondent's estate has benefited from criminal activities
(s 50 of the POCA).
While the provisions of the POCA serve as an effective tool in
the fight against crime, they also authorise a serious erosion of
the rights contained in the Bill of Rights. This erosion of funda-
mental rights is furthermore authorised 'merely on the basis of a
reasonable belief that the property targeted was involved in the
commission of crime or was its proceeds' (para [24]). However,
s 44 of the POCA ameliorates the adverse effect of a preservation
order and allows for the High Court who made the preservation
order to permit the payment of the reasonable living and legal
expenses of the owner of, or any other person holding an interest
in the property subject to the preservation order (paras [29],
[39]). In order to succeed with a request under s 44, two
requirements must be met:
* the respondent must be unable to meet the expenses con-
cerned from his/her property which is not subject to the
preservation order; and
* the respondent must have submitted a sworn and full state-
ment of all his or her assets and liabilities and must have
disclosed under oath all his or her interests in the property
(s 44(2)(a)-(b)).
In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Elran 2013 (1)
SACR 429 (CC); 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC) the National Director of
Public Prosecutions ('NDPP') obtained a far-reaching preserva-
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tion order against the respondent which required him to surren-
der his entire estate to a curator bonis, and preserved 'any
property held by him, whether in his own name or not, including
funds transferred from South Africa to any overseas account'
(para [4]).
The respondent opposed this order and requested the curator
bonis to provide him with the funds necessary to cover reason-
able living and legal expenses. But the curator bonis was not
satisfied and requested further information (para [5]). The NDPP
also opposed an application instituted by the respondent in the
High Court for the payment of his monthly living expenses and
the sum of R250 000 for legal fees (para [7]). The NDPP
contended that all the requirements of s 44(2) must be met for a
respondent to succeed, and that the respondent in this matter
had:
* property available that was not subject to the preservation
order and from which his expenses could be met (para [9]);
* failed to make a full disclosure of his interest in certain
property (para [10]);
* failed to provide a sworn and full statement of his assets and
liabilities (para [11 ]);
* failed to comply with the preservation order which required
that he (the respondent) continue to make monthly payments
under the mortgage bond held at the time the order was made
(para [12]).
On appeal against the decision of the court of first instance that
the respondent had met all the requirements of s 44 of the POCA
and was consequently entitled to reasonable living and legal
expenses to be paid from the preserved property, the NDPP
contended that a court cannot authorise payment of the
expenses if one of the requirements of s 44(2) has not been met,
regardless of the circumstances of the particular case (para
[34]).
Justice Jafta for the Constitutional Court (Moseneke, Nkabinda
and Yacoob concurring) held that such a stringent interpretation
of s 44(2) undermines the very purpose it is aimed to serve, and
will render the provisions of the POCA inconsistent with the
promotion of the right to legal representation. The interpretation
advanced by the NDPP would therefore not only render the
POCA unconstitutional, but would also lead to absurd results and
disempower courts in cases where all the requirements of s 44(2)
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have not been met (paras [35], [36]). It was consequently held
that s 44(2) must be interpreted to mean that a court may
authorise payment of expenses if it is satisfied that the applicant
cannot meet these expenses from unpreserved property, and he
or she is entitled to receive payment of expenses from the
property subject to the preservation order. In exercising this
discretion, the court will engage in a balancing exercise, weigh-
ing 'the applicant's interest, including the right to legal represen-
tation, against the objects of preserving the property subject to
the preservation order and preventing the applicant from benefit-
ting unduly from that property' (para [37]). And, it is at the stage of
balancing the competing interests that the court may take into
consideration factors such as whether the applicant has submit-
ted a list of assets and liabilities, and has disclosed all his or her
interests in the property (para [38]). However, the threshold in
every case will always be 'that the court is satisfied that the
applicant has no property that is not subject to a preservation
order and from which the requested expenses may be met' (para
[38]).The appeal was consequently dismissed.
A dissenting judgment by Justices Cameron and Zondi (dis-
cussed below) held that the requirements set out in s 44(2) of the
POCA are not jurisdictional facts, but rather preconditions, and
where these preconditions have not been met, a court is barred
from exercising its discretion. This dissenting judgment is based
on the assumption that ss 26 and 44 are similar (para [54]). See
below for a discussion of the difference between s 26 and s 44 of
the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998.
The difJference between s 26 and s 44 of the Prevention of Organised Crime
Act 121 of 1998
In a dissenting judgment in National Director of Public Prosecu-
tions v Fran 2013 (1) SACR 429 (CC); 2013 (4) BCLR 379 (CC)-
discussed above - Justices Cameron and Zondi submitted that
ss 26 and 44 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of
1998 are similar. In dispelling this assumption, Justice Jafta for
the Constitutional Court (Moseneke, Nkabinda and Yacoob con-
curring) held that both the structure and the requirements set out
in both provisions are materially different (paras [54], [55]).
Section 26 provides for restraint orders to be granted by way of
an ex parte application by a competent High Court prohibiting
any person from dealing in any manner with any property to
which the order relates. Similar to s 44(2), s 26(6) provides for the
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High Court to order that the reasonable living and legal expenses
of the person against whom the order is made be paid from the
restrained property. This is possible if two requirements are met:
'[I]f the court is satisfied that the person whose expenses must be
provided for has disclosed under oath all his or her interests in
property subject to a restraint order, and that the person cannot
meet the expenses concerned out of his or her unrestrained
property' (para [55]). More important than the property, therefore,
is the disclosure of an interest in restrained property for the
purposes of s 26(6). Section 44(2), on the other hand, requires a
list of assets and liabilities that extends beyond the property
subject to a preservation order (para [56]). The only similarities
between the requirements of the two provisions, therefore, are the
required disclosure of interests and the inability to meet
expenses (para [57]).
With regard to the structure of the two provisions, Justice Jafta
also found that a strict reading of the words 'shall not' and 'and'
that appear in both provisions, does not necessarily mean that
the requirements of s 44(2) are cumulative and interlinked, as
is the case with s 26(6) (paras [58], [59]). Compared to s 26(6),
s 44(1) and (2) both have two distinct subsections dealing
separately with living expenses and legal expenses. It was
consequently argued that the court is not obliged to order
provision for both the living and legal expenses in each and every
case. The context of s 44, it was held, is rather provided by
s 44(1) which confers a discretion on the court (paras [58], [59]).
An interpretation which prohibits the exercise of a discretion -
irrespective of the extent of consequential injustice - just
because a list of liabilities, for example, was not submitted, does
not promote the spirit, purport and the objects of the Bill of Rights
- which is pivotal when interpreting legislation (para [60]).
Requirements for the rescission of a preservation order in terms of s 44 of
the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998
The respondent in National Director of Public Prosecutions v
Nqini (4190/12) [2013] ZAECPEHC 38 (16 August 2013), applied
for the rescission of a preservation order made in terms of
s 38(1)(a) of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998.
Section 47 of the POCA sets out the requirements for the variation
or rescission of a preservation order and requires that the court
be satisfied that:
* the operation of the order will deprive the applicant of the
means to provide for his or her reasonable living expenses
and cause undue hardship; and
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the hardship that the applicant will suffer as a result of the
order outweighs the risk that the property concerned may be
destroyed, lost, damaged, concealed or transferred.
However, the respondent in this matter did not address these
two requirements in his application, and the application was
consequently treated as an opposition to the grant of the forfei-
ture order in terms of s 39(3) of the POCA.
An ajfected gift in terms of ss 12, 14 and 16 of the Prevention of
Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998
In NDPP v Cunningham [2013] 3 All SA 97 (WCC) the applicant
applied for the confirmation of the provisional restraint order
granted against family members of the respondent who allegedly
received affected gifts from the respondent (Also see NDPP v
Cunningham 2012 (2) SACR 591 (WCC)).
Cunningham was a trustee of the MIC Trust and also the
majority shareholder and managing director of Webworks (Pty)
Ltd. The sale of Webworks (Pty) Ltd to Fidentia for R160 million
was negotiated by Cunningham without the knowledge of
the minority shareholders. In order to secure the sale and the
maximum profit for himself, Cunningham convinced the minority
shareholders, before the sale of the company to Fidentia, to sell
him their shares in Webworks (Pty) Ltd at a considerably lower
price. The NDPP alleged that this constituted fraud as Cunning-
ham had materially misrepresented the true value of the shares,
as well as the financial affairs of Webworks to both Fidentia and
the minority shareholders (paras [5]-[14]).
In the subsequent delictual proceedings between Cunningham
and the minority shareholders, a settlement was reached and
Cunningham paid a total amount of R16 million to certain
shareholders in instalments, and registered mortgage bonds in
favour of the shareholders over immovable property held in his
(Cunningham's) name. The NDPP, however, argued that the
terms of this settlement agreement and the performance in terms
thereof, were an affected gift which constituted Cunningham's
realisable property. It was argued that the fifth respondent's claim
in terms of this settlement agreement was negated by the fact
that Cunningham had no lawful duty of care to disclose his fraud
and to share the proceeds thereof, and that the minority share-
holders, therefore, had no valid claim (para [25]). A provisional
restraint order was consequently granted against the fifth respon-
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dent in favour of the NDPP (paras [15]-[18] and see NDPP v
Cunningham 2012 (2) SACR 591 (WCC)).
The respondents, in turn, denied this, arguing that the NDPP
had failed to show that the alleged property transferred was for a
consideration considerably lower than the value of the consider-
ation supplied by Cunningham, and that the transfer of property
was the result of a compromise made by an order of the court
which had presided over the delictual action instituted by the
respondents against the applicant (Cunningham). It was also
argued that, in the absence of any statutory definition, the
ordinary dictionary meaning of the word 'gift' should be used, and
that a 'gift' therefore constitutes '. . . a willing [ordinary] transfer of
property from the defendant to a third party where no consider-
ation is given in return [no payment is expected in return]' (paras
[27]-[33]).
An affected gift, in terms of s 12 of Chapter 5 of the POCA,
constitutes any gift made no more than seven years before a
fixed date, and includes all property received by the defendant in
connection with an offence committed by him or her or any other
person, or any property or part thereof directly or indirectly
received by the defendant in connection with the offence commit-
ted. This includes property held by a person to whom the
defendant had made a direct or indirect gift, as well as property
transferred, directly or indirectly, for a consideration value which
is significantly less than the value of the consideration supplied
by the defendant (ss 14, 16, 20(2) of the POCA).
Henney J, for the Western Cape High Court, Cape Town,
agreed with the NDPP that the respondent's delictual claim was
negated by the fact that Cunningham could not be said to have
owed the respondents (minority shareholders) a lawful duty of
care to disclose his fraud and to share in the proceeds thereof.
The delictual claim, it was held, was based on misrepresentations
and the non-disclosure of true facts. And, even if Cunningham
had made no misrepresentations to the other shareholders and
had disclosed all information about his negotiations with Fidentia,
the shareholders would still not have been able to receive their
proportionate share of the profit, as the sale was entered into
based on Cunningham's fraudulent misrepresentations to Fiden-
tia, and the proceeds from it were therefore acquired by fraudu-
lent means (paras [39]-[46]).
With regard to the question of whether the property transferred
constituted an affected gift, it was held that even where the
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proceeds of a crime have been transferred to an innocent party,
that an innocent party is not protected from the effect or conse-
quences of the crime as the gift remains the proceeds of a
criminal offence. '[Thus,] what the [respondents] received [is
therefore] susceptible to be restrained as part of the realisable
property of Cunningham which forms part of the proceeds of his
alleged crime in terms of the provisions of POCA and is an
affected gift' (para [48]). This included the mortgage bonds
advanced in favour of the fifth respondent, as well as the cash
payments made in terms of the judgment in the delictual action
against Cunningham (paras [63], [75]).
THE IMPORTANCE OF A PROBATION OFFICER'S REPORT IN THE
SENTENCING OF A MINOR ACCUSED
Section 71 of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 stipulates that,
before the imposition of a sentence, a sentencing court must
request a pre-sentence report prepared by a probation officer
(appointed in terms of the Probation Services Act 116 of 1991).
This is necessary as it is 'the best way to obtain relevant
information pertaining to a youth, to enable a magistrate to
structure a sentence that will best suit the needs and interests of
a youth' (S v Oz2013 (2) SACR 138 (GNP) para [6]).
According to Justices Rabie and Thulare in the Oz case, such
a probation report will allude to the childhood of the accused,
whether it was characterised by neglect, lack of discipline or
ineffective parenting. It will also shed light on whether the
accused has challenges inherent to his faculties, challenges from
his family set-up or challenges from the community from which he
or she has emerged. Failure to obtain such a probation report
before sentencing is a misdirection and denies the sentencing
court the opportunity to impose a sentence that would promote
the rehabilitation of the appellant (para [6]).
Also see S v Chetty 2013 (2) SACR 142 (SCA) where the
importance of a probation officer's report was also emphasised
for the purpose of sentencing an adult accused who was the
primary caregiver of his daughter, and S v Mankayi (243/2013)
[2013] ZAECGHC 79 (15 August 2013), where the sentencing
court took into account previous convictions disclosed in a
probation officer's report, that were neither raised nor proved by
the state.
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REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AMENDMENT OF A CHARGE SHEET AND
INDICTMENT
The accused in S v Mpambanso 2013 (2) SACR 186 (ECB) was
charged with over 200 counts of theft and fraud. These charges
were later reduced to 54 separate charges of fraud in a process
of attrition between the accused and the state. After both the state
and the accused had closed their cases - the latter without
having led any evidence - the state applied for the charge sheet
to be amended combining all the individual counts into a single
count of fraud (paras [2], [3]).
This amendment was sought in terms of s 86(1) of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 which provides for a charge to be
amended where:
* it is defective for the want of any essential averment; or
* where there appears to be any variance between any aver-
ment in a charge and the evidence adduced in proof of such
averment; or
* where it appears that words or particulars that ought to have
been inserted in the charge have been omitted therefrom; or
* where any words or particulars that ought to have been
omitted from the charge have been inserted therein; or
* where there is any other error in the charge.
According to the state, the amendment was necessary as there
was an error in the charge. This error related to the 'question
whether the State has proved on which of the particular counts
set out in the indictment the accused has committed any of the
offences with which he has been charged' (para [7]). However,
Justice Nepgen for the for the Eastern Cape High Court, Bhisho,
found that the words 'any other error in the charge' of s 86(1) of
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, must be interpreted 'with
regard to the eiusdem generis rule so that it referred to a defect in
the charge which was similar to the sort of defects listed earlier
in the subsection' (para [7]). Further, a court can only order an
amendment of a charge if it considers that the making of the
relevant amendment will not prejudice the accused in his
defence (para [10]). The onus, here, rests on the state to
establish that the accused will not be prejudiced (para [11 ]).
In this matter, the state did not show that the accused would not
be prejudiced in his defence as all the state witnesses had by
that stage already been cross-examined and certain aspects of
the evidence had not been challenged. The accused had further-
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more already closed his case without testifying or leading evi-
dence. The application for the amendment of the charge sheet
was consequently dismissed (para [13]).
STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH PRESCRIBED MINIMUM SENTENCES IF NO
SUBSTANTAL AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST
The respondents in S v Nkunkuma and others (101/2013)
[2013] ZASCA 122 (23 September 2013), were convicted on
charges of housebreaking with the intent to rob, robbery with
aggravating circumstances and rape in contravention of the
provisions of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related
Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. The first respondent was
sentenced to an effective eighteen years' imprisonment, the
second accused to three years and the third accused to an
effective term of fifteen years' imprisonment.
In arriving at these sentences the sentencing court further
found that substantial and compelling circumstances existed as
envisaged in s 51(3) of the Act. It was, however, unclear which
factors it actually found to constitute substantial and compelling
circumstances (para [13]). On appeal, the sentencing court was
criticised for considering only the triad of the offence, offender
and the interests of society, and balancing these interests against
each other. It was emphasised that where no substantial or
compelling circumstances exist, a court must impose the pre-
scribed minimum sentences. The prescribed minimum sen-
tences should therefore have been imposed on the first and third
respondents (para [18]).
With regard to the second respondent's sentence, it was held
that while his role had been substantially lesser than that of the
others, the effective sentence of three years' imprisonment was
woefully inappropriate and shockingly lenient in light of the
seriousness of the crimes and the manner in which the crimes
were committed. The prescribed minimum sentence of fifteen
years' imprisonment should also remain the starting point for the
purpose of sentencing for this particular accused (para [20]).
The second respondent was consequently sentenced to an
effective term of twelve years' imprisonment, and the first and
third accused to two years' imprisonment for housebreaking with
the intent to rob, fifteen years' for robbery with aggravating
circumstances and life imprisonment on the charge of rape (para
[21]).
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Also see S vBoshoff 2014 (1) SACR 422 (ECG) where the court
emphasised that when statutorily prescribed minimum sentences
apply, a trial court is not at liberty to impose whatever sentence it
considers appropriate on 'a clean slate'. The starting point must
always be the minimum sentence as prescribed in legislation
(para [10]).
SPECIAL REVIEW IN TERMS OF SECTION 304(4) OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977
The accused in S v Singh 2013 (2) SACR 372 (KZD) was
convicted of negligent driving and sentenced to a fine of R4 000
or four months' imprisonment. On the insistence of the accused's
legal representative, the presiding magistrate referred the matter
on special review in terms of s 304(4) of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977. The accused and his legal representative alleged
that the conduct of the presiding magistrate amounted to gross
irregularity and bias, that inadmissible evidence had been
allowed and there had been unnecessary delays in the finalisa-
tion of the case - allegations which the magistrate denied (para
[4]).
Justice Khallil for the KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban,
described this action as highly irregular and 'disturbing' as 'a
magistrate who approaches a high court with a view of having
proceedings reviewed in terms of s 304(4) of the Criminal Proce-
dure Act 51 of 1977 should, at the least, specifically submit that
the proceedings were not in accordance with justice' (para [13];
S v De Wee and Others 2006 (1) SACR 210 (NC)). It was held that
the magistrate in this instance submitted a matter on special
review in the absence of any grounds, and 'allowed himself to be
used as an agent for the accused in not only submitting the
matter on special review but also in procuring the transcript of
the proceedings at State expense and supplying the defence
with a copy of same' (paras [14], [15]). This was held to be an
abuse of the review process as provided for in s 304(4) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (para [14]).
SEARCH AND SEIZURE OPERATIONS WITHOUT A WARRANT IN TERMS
OF SECTION 4(4) OF THE CUSTOMS AND EXCISE ACT 91 OF
1964 DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
In Gaertner v Minister of Finance 2013 (4) SA 87 (WCC), s 4(4)
of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 was declared
unconstitutional.
374 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW
The Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 is fiscal; it imposes
customs duty on goods imported into South Africa and excise
duty on goods manufactured in South Africa (para [18]). These
taxes are payable if the goods are intended for consumption in
South Africa. Therefore, if goods are merely passing through
South Africa in transit to another jurisdiction, no duties are
payable (para [19]). Section 4(4) of the Act allows the South
African Revenue Service ('SARS') to undertake search and
seizure operations without prior notice and without obtaining a
search warrant from a judicial officer. Section 4(6) further pro-
vides SARS officials and others assisting them in the search and
seizure operation with far-reaching powers, including the power
to enter premises by force. Although, in its answering papers, the
SARS defended the impugned provisions in their entirety, it also
conceded that s 4(4)-(6) was constitutionally invalid (para [14]).
The SARS's main argument was that the impugned provisions
were justified to the extent that they authorised searches without
a warrant, whether routine or targeted, of designated premises,
but unjustified to the extent that they permitted these searches,
whether routine or targeted, of non-designated premises (para
[16]). It was also argued that s 4(4) did not permit SARS officers
to enter property without the owner's consent, and if an owner
declined to allow the SARS access, the SARS officers would need
to obtain a warrant to enter and search the premises.
However, the Western Cape High Court found no justification
for this argument as the impugned section does not state that the
consent of the owner is required: 'It merely gives a blunt power of
entry without prior notice' (para [60]). The Act further contains no
provisions for the obtaining of a warrant if consent is refused
(para [61]). And, if s 4(4) were indeed read to mean that a SARS
officer was only to enter and search premises with the consent of
the owner, then it was completely superfluous as '. . . statutory
authority is not needed to enter and search premises with the free
consent of the owner' (para [62]). It was therefore held that
s 4(4)-4(6) empowers SARS officers to do all the acts listed in
those sections without the owner's consent and without a warrant
(para [63]).
But, in terms of the justifications raised by the SARS for the
infringement on privacy that these provisions permit, the court
agreed that routine searches without a warrant of persons
registered and licensed in terms of the Customs and Excise Act,
did not make significant inroads into the privacy of those individu-
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als because ... their reasonable expectation of privacy in
relation to such searches is low and because such searches do
not resemble criminal investigations' (para [87]). The court con-
cluded that 'a warrant appears to me to be a somewhat pointless
requirement for random routine inspections' (para [87]). This
included routine inspections of designated premises such as
pre-entry facilities, licensed warehouses, and rebate stores, but
only to the extent that the search related to the business of
operating the pre-entry facility or to the business of the licensed
warehouse or rebate store (para [103]).
No justification could, however, be found for the non-routine
search without a warrant of premises of registered persons (para
[89]). The court further held that the Customs and Excise Act
should provide for those instances where a warrant is constitu-
tionally required, and that such a warrant has not been obtained
under the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure or the
National Prosecuting Authority Acts. It was held that: 'SARS
should not have to depend on the police in order to obtain
warrants for these searches. SARS' answering papers claimed
that because of the high volume of customs investigations and
their specialised nature, dependence on the police would "effec-
tively stymie" searches for the Act's purposes' (para [106]).
The court also held that there was an urgent need for guide-
lines for SARS officials operating in terms of the provisions of the
Act (para [104]). The following guidance was consequently
provided to properly balance the searched person's right to
privacy with the SARS's legitimate interest in infringing upon such
privacy:
* Entry may only take place during ordinary business hours,
unless the SARS officer reasonably considers that the entry is
necessary on grounds of urgency.
* The officer should inform the person in charge of the premises
whether the search is routine or non-routine. In the case of
a non-routine search, the officer in charge must furnish the
person with a written statement setting out the purpose
of the search. Deviation from this requirement is possible
where the officer reasonably considers that there are circum-
stances of urgency warranting such a deviation.
* Only those officers whose presence is reasonably necessary
to conduct the search should enter the premises.
* With regard to the question of whether the commencement of
a search should be delayed for the person's legal representa-
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tive to arrive, or whether such a person should be informed of
his or her right to contact his or her legal representative, it was
held that the corresponding provisions of the Criminal Proce-
dure Act 51 of 1977 and the National Prosecuting Authority Act
32 of 1998 do not contain such requirements. Thus, while it is
recommended, it is not required. The court merely required
that the person in charge of the premises or his or her
delegate be allowed to observe and be present during all
aspects of the search operation.
* An inventory of all items seized should furthermore be pro-
vided and where documents are copied, a list of all the
material copied should be made.
* It was also emphasised that decency and order should be
strictly observed throughout the search (para [105]).
It was consequently declared that s 4(4)(aXi) and (ii), 4(4)(b),
4(5) and 4(6) of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 were
inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore invalid (para [119]).
SEPARATION OF CHARGES - HOUSEBREAKING WITH THE INTENT TO
ROB AND ROBBERY
In S v Cetwayo 2002 (2) SACR 319 (E) it was held that
housebreaking with the intent to commit an offence is in itself
an offence, separate from the actual offence for the purpose
of which the housebreaking was committed. However, if the
offences relate to 'what is in effect a single incident, they are,
unless there is good reason to the contrary, charged as a single
offence and a single punishment is imposed' (321).
This, it was held in S v Maswetsa (CC 28/2013) [2013]
ZAGPPHC 162 (30 May 2013), can no longer hold good after the
promulgation of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
which prescribed minimum sentences for the offences falling
within the ambit of the Act (para [3]). For example, the Criminal
Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 prescribes a minimum sen-
tence for a conviction of housebreaking with the intent to rob in
Part IV of Schedule 2. In terms of this provision, a first offender
should be sentenced to a minimum term of five years' imprison-
ment a second offender to seven years and a third offender to
ten years' imprisonment. Robbery, on the other hand, can attract
a minimum sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment for first
offenders, twenty years for second offenders and 25 years for
third offenders (para [3]). A conviction of housebreaking with the
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intent to rob can furthermore not be regarded as a previous
conviction for the purpose of sentencing on a charge of robbery
(para [3]). For this reason the charges must be formulated
separately in the charge sheet and combined charges should no
longer be allowed (para [4]).
THE IMPACT (IF ANY) OF THE PERIOD SPENT IN DETENTION
AWAITING TRIAL ON THE FINAL SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT
The appellants in Radebe and Another v S 2013 (2) SACR 165
(SCA) were convicted on three counts of robbery with aggravat-
ing circumstances, one count of having contravened s 3 of the
Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 and one count of contravening
s 90 of that Act. The first appellant was sentenced to an effective
term of 20 years' imprisonment and the second appellant to an
effective term of 22 years. They were also granted leave to appeal
against their sentences as the period they had spent in prison
awaiting trial (two years and four months) was not taken into
account (para [2]).
In S v Brophy 2007 (2) SACR 56 (W), Justice Schwartzman held
that 'the rule of thumb in determining an appropriate sentence...
[is] to take into account the period in detention awaiting the
completion of the trial and double it' (para [11]). This double
period, it was held, should then be deducted from the period of
imprisonment proposed for sentencing. (For an opposing view
see S v Vilikazi 2000 (1) SACR 140 (W) 148a-e.)
Justice Lewis (Leach and Erasmus concurring) for the
Supreme Court of Appeal found that there should be no rule of
thumb for the calculation of the weight to be given to the period
spent by an accused awaiting trial (para [13] and also see S v
Seboko 2009 (2) SACR 573 (NCK) para [22]). The personal
circumstances of each accused should rather be assessed to
establish an appropriate sentence, and to what extent the period
spent in prison awaiting trial should impact on the final term of
imprisonment (para [13]). The period in detention pre-sentence is
therefore 'but one of the factors that should be taken into account
in determining whether the effective period of imprisonment to be
imposed is justice' (para [14]).
Also see S v Malgas and Others 2013 (2) SACR 343 (SCA) in
which it was held that there can be 'no automatic alleviation of a
sentence merely because of the long interval of time between the
imposition of a sentence and the hearing of the appeal for those
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persons fortunate enough to have been granted bail, pending the
appeal' (para [20]).
TRIAL PREJUDICE AS A GROUND FOR A PERMANENT STAY OF
PROSECUTION IN TERMS OF S 342A OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ACT 51 OF 1977
In Mamase v National Director of Public Prosecutions and
Others 2013 (2) SACR 491 (ECG), the applicant and her husband
applied for a permanent stay of prosecution under s 342A of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. They were both indicted for
five offences under the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt
Activities Act 12 of 2004, and were also charged with one count of
fraud together with a company of which they were the directors
(para [2]). The applicants first appeared during March 2005, after
which the charges were provisionally withdrawn on 16 October
2009. An indication was given, however, that they could again be
charged in the future. The applicants subsequently applied for a
permanent stay of prosecution on 13 February 2012, and the
Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions signed a new indictment
on 20 August 2012 (para [2]).
This case has a long and protracted history characterised by
numerous delays. For example, the four co-accused initially
charged together with the applicant were later removed and
certain of them agreed to testify on behalf of the state (para [9]).
The applicant and her husband then challenged the jurisdiction
of the court which was set down for hearing, and by the time that
the Supreme Court of Appeal had made a decision on the matter,
a new prosecutor had been appointed to the case (paras [10],
[11]). By this stage, a decision had also been made not to
continue with the prosecution of the applicant's husband due
to his ill health and a plea and sentence agreement that had been
entered into between the state and another former accused (para
[11]). Thereafter, the Directorate of Special Operations ('DSO'),
who had borne the sole responsibility for this case, was dis-
banded, and the prosecutor seconded to the case was deployed
to the Organised Crime Unit. This matter did not fall into the
organised crime category, but the prosecutor had then already
been transferred to the Specialised Commercial Crime United
('SCCU') which also assumed responsibility for the case (paras
[13]-[15]). A considerable time was further spent on locating and
consulting with potential state witnesses, some of whom lived in
Australia and, for various reasons, had difficulty in finalising their
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travel arrangements to South Africa (paras [15]-[22]). All these
procedural and practical hiccups contributed to the applicant's
drawn-out prosecution.
The applicant argued that she had been severely prejudiced
by these delays, in addition to having been 'socially and profes-
sionally compromised' (para [26]). She further claimed that 'the
lapse of time since the alleged criminal conduct has rendered it
impossible for her to have a fair trial', and that it 'would be
impossible for her to investigate new allegations in [the most
recent] indictment after the lapse of nine years' (para [27]).
However, Justice Roberson for the Eastern Cape High Court,
Grahamstown, found that while these delays were unfortunate,
they were not unusual and related largely to systemic problems
encountered by the National Prosecuting Authority (paras
[39]-[41]). The applicant was, furthermore, not in custody, and
her liberty and security had therefore not been affected (para
[44]). Finally, as the latest version of the indictment had a similar
factual foundation as the earlier indictment, the applicant's
argument with regard to trial prejudice could not stand (para
[45]).
It was therefore concluded that the applicant had not succeeded
in demonstrating significant trial prejudice, and that the serious
nature of the offences with which she was charged warranted
further investigation and prosecution (paras [47]-[49]).
